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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT'E O·F UTAH
BEEHIVE STATE BANK,
a corporation,
PlaJintiff - Appellant,
-vs.DEON ROSQUIST, GERALDINE
ROSQUIST and ILA R. PAINTER, Individuals, and CARPETS,
INC., a corporation,
Def enda.nts,
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF
UTAH, N.A., a corporation,
Garnishee,
FRED L. PAINTER,
Intervener - Respondent.

Case
No.11053

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant obtained a Summary Judgment against
defendant Ila R. Painter and no appeal was taken therefrom; her husband, intervener Fred L. Painter, sought
in this proceeding to obtain a release of a Garnishment
served upon garnishee.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent made a motion to dismiss the Garnishment issued and served upon the Nephi, Utah, branch of
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., and for other
appropriate relief. The court ordered the Garnishment
released and discharged and awarded respondent judgment against appellant for interest at the legal rate of
six percent (6%) per annum on the sum of $723.79 from
February 3, 1964, to the date of the Judgment, amounting to the sum of $157.38, and attorney's fees in the sum
of $250.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment of the
lower court which released and discharged the Garnishment, and an order awarding appellant garnishee judgment for the entire joint bank account held by garnishee
in the names of defendant Ila R. Painter and her husband, Fred L. Painter, intervener-respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about March 8, 1961, defendants Deon Rosquist, Geraldine Rosquist and Ila R. Painter entered into
a property improvement contract with Carpets, Inc., for
the sale of certain carpeting, paddings and other floor
coverings for the agreed consideration of $887.40, payable in monthly installments of $24.65 each commencing
on the 21st day of April, 1961, and continuing on the 21st
day of each and every month thereafter until the entire
balance was paid in full. ( R. 29) The eon tract was sold
2

and assigned to appellant on March 8, 1961. (R. 30) The
above named defendants made eight partial payments
on said contract, which, after deduction of late charges,
left an unpaid balance of $703.73.
On June 5, 1962, appellant commenced an action
against defendants Deon Rosquist, Geraldine Rosquist
and Carpets, Inc., by filing a Complaint. (R. 1-3) Those
defendants were personally served with a Summons, but
did not answer. (R. 4-6) A Default Judgment was obtained against defendants Deon Rosquist and Geraldine
Rosquist on July 5, 1962, for the sum of $741.02, plus
attorney's fees in the sum of $234.27, together with interest thereon at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum until paid. (R. 8) An Amended Complaint was filed
on December 31, 1962, to include defendant, Ila R. Painter. ( R. 19-22) Def eudant Ila R. Painter was personally
served with a Summons on January 2, 1963 (R. 22-23)
Defendant Ila R. Painter filed an Answer to said Amended Complaint on January 23, 1963. (R. 24) Motion for
Summary Judgment against Ila R. Painter and Notice
was filed on July 5, 1963. (R. 31-32) A Summary Judgment Against Defendant Ila R. Painter was entered on
July 29, 1963, for $741.02, plus attorney's fees in the
sum of $234.27 and costs of $15.20, making an aggregate
total of $990.49, together with interest thereon at the
rate of eight percent ( 8%) per annum until paid.
(R. 33-34)
A Garnishment was issued naming defendants Deon
Rosquist, Geraldine Rosquist and Ila R. Painter and
served on the Nephi, Utah, branch of First Security Bank
3

of Utah, N.A., on February 3, 1964. (R. 35) First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., answered the Garnishment stating that they had a joint deposit account in the names of
Fred L. Painter and Ila R. Painter with a balance of
$723.79 at the time of service of the Garnishment. (R. 36)
A Motion for Entry of Garnishee Judgment and Notice
was filed by appellant on April 9, 1964. (R. 37) The
lower court heard the motion on August 7, 1964, and
failed to enter a Garnishee Judgment but charged First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. with a continuing obligation to appellant in the sum of $723.79. Defendant Ila
R. Painter died on February 12, 1966.
A Motion for Leave to Intervene and Motion to
Dismiss Garnishment was filed by Intervener on
August 29, 1967. (R. 40-41) An Order Granting Leave
to Intervene in Garnishment Proceedings and Fixing Time for Hearing Motion to Dismiss Garnishment was granted on September 15, 1967 (R. 39) A
Memorandum Decision was entered by the lower court
on September 15, 1967. (R. 45) The lower court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Motion of Intervener for Judgment in Garnishment Proceedings on September 19, 1967. ( R. 57 -59) A J udgment in Garnishment Proceedings releasing and discharging the Garnishment was signed on September 19,
1967. (R. 50-51) Appellant filed a Motion to Amend
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Submitted by
Intervener on September 5, 1967. (R. 46-49) Intervener's
Objections to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Findings and
Conclusions was filed on October 10, 1967. (R. 54-55) The
lower court on October 16, 1967, entered an Order Deny4

ing Motion to Amend Findings of Fact andConclusions
of Law. (R. 56) A Notice of Appeal was filed on October
19, 1967. (R. 66-67)
ARGUMENT
A. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELEASING AND DISCHARGING THE
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT ISSUED AND
SERVED UPON GARNISHEE.

1. A Joint Bank Account Held by Garnishee in
the Names of Defenda.nt Ila R. Painter and
Respondent Is Subject to Garnishment by
Appellant as Judgment Creditor of Defenda;nt Ila R. Painter.
Rule 64 D(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly allows a plaintiff the supplementary remedy of
garnishment. Rule 64 D (a) states as follows:
"The plaintiff, at any time after the filing of the
complaint, may have a writ of garnishment issue,
and attach the credits, effects, debts, choses in
action, money, and other personal property of the
defendant in the possession or in the control of
any third person, as garnishee, whether the same
are due at the time of the service of the writ or
are to become due thereafter under the same circumstances and by filing with the court in which
the action is pending an affidavit as required by
subdivision (a) of Rule 64C, relating to Attachments; provided, that in addition to the requirements of the affidavit for a writ of attachment the
affidavit for a writ of garnishment shall state that
plaintiff has a good reason to believe and does
believe that a particular person, firm or corporation, private or public, has property, money,
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goods, chattels, credits or effects in his or its
hands or under hi:-; or its control belo11ging to the
defendant, or that such person, firm or corporation is indebtPd to the dcfrndaut."
Rule 64 D(b) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
states that after entry of judgment the clerk may issue
a writ of garnishment without the necessity of an affidavit
as a condition precedent thereof. Rule 64D(b) (2), in
part, states as follows:
''After the entry of judgment, the clerk of any
court from which execution thereon may be issued
shall, upon request of the judgment creditor, issue
a writ of garnishment and no affidavit or undertaking shall be necessary as a condition therefor."
The inadequacy in many cases of the ordinary means
of enforcing a money judgment has led to the very important supplementary remedy of garnishment after
judgment. The purpose of the supplementary remedy
of garnishment after judgment is well statecl in 30 AM.
JuR.2d Executions ~ 776 (EJG7), as follows:
"The object of supplementary proceedings is not
to obtain a new judgment for a debt, but to enable
the judgment creditor to enforce the judgment he
has already obtained. Tht>y are designed to provide a useful, efficacious, and salutary remedy at
law, and to afford to a judgment creditor the
most complete relief possible in satisfying his
judgment. A purpose of the proceedings is to
ascertain whether the judgment debtor owns
property whieh can be applied in satisfaction of
the judgment. Sueh proee0dings are particularly
designed to reach and apply to the satisfaction of
the judgment, property of tlw judgment debtor
which is conceal0d, or whieh is in the hands of a
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third person and which cannot be reached by the
ordinary execution.''
The garnishment issued and served in these proceedings wa8 in no way wrongful. Appellant was in good
faith attempting to ascertain the true and specific interest of defendant Ila R. Painter in any property held by
garnishee.

It seems well settled that a joint bank account is subject to garnishment by a judgment creditor of only one
of the joint depositors. 30 AM. J uR.2d Executions § 800
(1967), states as follows:
'' .:\fost courts are agreed that a joint bank account
is garnishable by a judgment creditor of only one
of the joint depositors. In this respect, it has been
held if, under the terms of the deposit agreement,
a check for the amount of the judgment signed by
the judgment debtor alone ·would have been honored, garnishment is available against the joint
bank account.''
This court has faced the question of whether a creditor can reach a joint bank account held in the names of
the debtor and another person and has determined that
the joint bank account can be reached by the creditor.
Neill Y. Royce, 101Utah181, 120 P.2d 327 (1941).
In recognizing that both parties to a joint bank account would attempt to defeat a judgment creditor's
rights, the following statement was made in a Note,
Joiut Bauk Accounts in Utah, 8 UTAH L. REv. 57, 65
(1962):
'' T11ere is no question that a creditor can reach
as8ets of a debtor held by him in a joint account.
7

Because both parties to an account would have a
common desire to defeat or minimize the creditor's access to the funds, their version of the
present inter vivos interest is likely to contradict
his. Thus, a creditor may have difficulty proving
that the debtor was the sole contributor, the
amount of his contribution, or whether he was a
codepositor who had actually been given a present
interest or a depositor with only a convenience
object in view."
There are other authorities which recognize the
right of a creditor to reach a joint bank account. 11
A.L.R. 3rd, 1465, Joint Bank Account as Subject to Attachment, Garnishment, or Execution by Creditor of one
of the Joint Depositors at page 1468 (1967), states as
follows:
"In any event, most courts are agreed that a
joint bank account is garnishable at the behest
of a creditor of one of the depositors. There are,
however, a few cases holding for various reasons,
that a joint bank account is not so garnishable,
principally in jurisdictions that recognize tenancies by the entirety in personal property and consider that one was created as to the account
sought to be garnished.''

United States v. Third Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 11 F.
Supp. (M.D. Pa. -1953); Tinsley v. Bauer, 126 Cal.App.2d
724, 271 P.2d 116 (1954); Leaf v. McGowan, 13 Ill. App.
2d 58, 141 N.E.2d 67 (1957); Neill v. Royce, supra; Park
Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N.W.2d
194 (1951), and mauy other cases hold that a joint bank
account may be seized under an attachment or execution
by a creditor of one of the joint depositors.
8

The Utah cases make it clear that where a joint bank
account is created, there is a strong presumption that the
joint account is valid and will be treated according to
the terms of the signature card signed by the parties.
The case of Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367
P.2d 179 (1961), involved a controversy over two joint
savings accounts in which the decedent, the original
owner of the funds, added the defendant's name to the
account ten months prior to his death. The plaintiff, as
executor of the estate of the decedent, brought an action
to recover the funds. The lower court ruled summarily
before trial that the defendant was entitled to the funds.
This Court reversed the lower court and stated as
follows:
"Notwithstanding what may have been said
therein, we are of the opinion that the rule which
is sound in principle and practical in application
is that applied in the cases of Neill v. Royce and
Greener v. Greener, supra: that where there is a
written agreement of joint tenancy with right of
survivorship, there is a presumption of validity
and it will be given effect unless it is successfully
attacked for fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other
infirmity, or unless it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parties intended otherwise; and further, that such rule is applicable
whether the parties are living or where death has
intervened. Nor would the fact that the original
owner may have changed his mind after the creation of the account alter the applicability of that
rule.'' Tattigren v. Ingalls, supra, 12 Utah 2d at
394, 367 P .2d at 184.
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The case of Hanks v. Hales, 17 Utah 2d 344, 411 P.2c1
836 (1966), emphasizes the presumption of validity given
to a joint bank account. In that case, the plaintiffs, as
grandchildren and heirs of the decedent, commenced an
action claiming a share of six bank accountf; held in joint
tenancy by their grandmother and her two daughters, the
defendants in the case. The joint bank accounts were
created several years prior to the decedent's death and
were of the type commonly used, whereby either party
could withdraw the funds and providing for the right of
survivorship. All of the funds had been deposited by the
decedent. Shortly before the decedent's death, the defendants withdrew the funds which they divided between
them.
The plaintiffs in that case argued that the decedent
did not intend to give the defendants ownership in the
funds nor to create a true joint tenancy ·with right of
survivorship. The defendants moved for a dismissal of
the action which was granted. On appeal to this Court it
was stated as follo-ws :
"""We are thus brought to a consideration of the
principal difficulty - confronting the plaintiffs:
They are trying to defeat the effect of a written
instrument. It is endowed with a presumption of
validity. Its provisions, inclucling the recited facts
of joint tenancy with right of survivorship, must
be given effect unless it is successfully attacked on
some proper ground; and it can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.'' Han ks
v. Hales, supra, 17 Utah 2<1at346, 411 P.2d at 837.
These cases, when applied to the case at har, make
it patently clear that appellant is Pntitled to a garnishee
10

judgment against the joint bank account at the Nephi,
Utah, branch of First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., held
in the names of defendant Ila R. Painter and respondent. 'I1he cited cases make it clear that the presumption
of joint tenancy can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof to the contrary. Respondent has not introduced a scintilla of competent evidence to overcome
this presmption. That respondent filed an affidavit in
the lower court claiming that the funds deposited in the
joint checking account were his sole property does not in
the least overcome the presumption that a valid joint
account was created and that respondent did in fact intend to create a valid legal interest in his wife, defendant Ila R. Painter. Said affidavit is not proper evidence
and for the reason that appellant was given no opportunity to cross-examine respondent. The joint bank
account in question must be treated as what it truly is a joint account in which either party at any time could
withdraw all of the funds and a joint account in which a
creditor of either should be subrogated to those rights.
In a Comment, 60 MICH. L. REv., 972, 982-83 (1962),
the following comments were made concerning the presumptions involved in a creditor situation:
"As long as the intervivos disputes are between
the donor and donee themselves, those courts
which employ ·weak presumptions in these cases
treat the joint account form as having a relatively
minor significance in determining the parties' interests. The donee has little equity in his favor,
having given no consideration for the interest he
now claims and basing his clemand solely on the
largesse of the donor. In these circumstances, the
11

donor is granted a great deal of leeway in challenging and def eating the do nee 's claims.
''When creditors enter the picture, however,
these same courts are less willing to allow the
donor to disaffirm the donee 's interests to the detriment of creditors who may not know of any particular relationships or agreements between the
co-depositors and who may have extended credit
on the faith of the donee 's apparent interest in
the account.
''Thus, courts that would ordinarily deny to the
donee any presumption of an intervivos interest
or would invoke only a weak presumption do just
the opposite in creditor situations. The donee is
presumed to have a joint interest in the account
and the burden of proof is placed upon the party
contesting the donee 's interest.
''Those courts which invoke a strong intervivos
presumption for the donee in the first instance
need not change their presumption to accomplish
the same result. The creditor, in both weak and
strong presumption jurisdictions, can thus rely
on the form of the account to raise a presumption
that the donee does have an interest that is subject to attachment and the co-depositors must
sustain the burden of proving the donor's contrary intent in order to rebut the presumption."
In 1961 the Savings & Loan Act enacted a statute
which makes tlie terms of a joint account in a savings and
loan association conclusive in the absence of fraud or
undue influence. Section 7-13-39, Utah Code Annotated
(Supp. 1967).
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Section 7-3-45, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1967),
was amended in 1965 to add a paragraph which, in part,
states as follows:
"A bank shall not be required to pay out all or
any part of the credit balance in any such joint
account pursuant to an attachment, execution,
garnishment, judgment, or other legal process
issued in any action or proceeding against any
one or more but less than all of the persons to
whom the account is payable until the bank has
been furnished a certified copy of an order of a
court of competent jurisdiction determining that
such person or persons owned a specified part or
all of such credit balance at the time such process
was served on the bank.''
The only logical construction which can be given to
the statute is that prior to the enactment of said statute
a bank could pay out the balance of a joint bank account
pursuant to an attachment, execution, garnishment, judgment or other legal process issued in any action or proceeding against any one or more but less than all of the
persons to whom the account is payable without being
furnished a certified copy of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction determining that such person or persons owned a specified part or all of such credit balance
at the time such process was served on the bank.
The Garnishment in the case at hand was issued and
serYed prior to the enactment of the statute. As a practical matter no bank would pay out all or any part of the
credit balance in a joint account pursuant to a garnishment without a court order, but not until the enactment

13

of this statute was mention made of portions owned by
the parties.
It is of interest that Section 7-3-45, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1967), specifically recognizes that a joint
bank account is subject to garnishment.
A creditor's right to garnishee a joint bank account
for the debt of one of the depositors ceases upon the
death of the depositor. Deforge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568,
76 N.W. 2d 733 (1956); Weaver v. Pickard, 7 Utah 299,
26 Pac. 581 (1891). However, in the case at bar, the
Judgment against Mrs. Painter was obtained prior to her
death and the Garnishment was issued and served prior
to her death.
2. Appellant Should Be Allowed a Garnishee

Judgment on the Entire Joint Bank Account Held in the Names of Defendant Ila
R. Painter and Respondent.

Since by the terms of the joint bank account agreement both defendant Ila R. Painter and respondent are
given the unconditional power to withdraw all of the
funds from the joint bank account at any time, appellant should be subrogated to the right of defendant Ila
R. Painter and therefore be allowed a garnishee judgment on .the entire sum of the joint bank account. Any
different rule would defraud creditors. The parties to a
joint bank account should not be allowed to come in after
a judgment has been obtained against one of the parties
and contradict the terms of the very agreement which
they voluntarily signed.

14

In Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, supra, the plaintiff ::med the clef endant to enforce payment of rent under
an oral lease between the parties. The plaintiff in ancillary proceedings garnisheed a joint bank account
standing in the 11ame of the defendant and his wife and
the wife intervened in the case. The lower court determined that it was impossible to determine on an evidentiary basis the exact amount of funds each had contributed to the account. The lower court concluded that the
defendant and his wife should be presumed equal owners
and ordered judgment against the garnishee for the
amount of the default judgment obtained against the defendant in the main action, but not to exceed one-half
of the joint account. The plaintiff appealed and the Minnesota Supreme Court stated as follows:
"By the deposit agreement here involved, each
depositor has given the other depositor in the account complete and absolute authority over it and
unconditional power to withdraw all or any part
of the account. By the terms of the agreement,
the bank is likewise obliged to pay any part or all
of the account to either depositor upon demand.
''Since in purpose and legal effect a garnishment
proceeding is virtually an action brought by defendant in plaintiff's name against the garnishee,
resulting in the subrogation of the plaintiff to the
right of the defendant against the garnishee, we
have concluded that plaintiff here may not only
garnishee this joint account, but also that it would
be entitled to recover judgment against the garnishee for the entire amount of the account if its
judgment against defendant were sufficient to exhau~t it. Defendant is entitled to withdraw a!fly
vart or all of the account, nnd plaintiff, in effect, is
subrogated to that right." (Emphasis added) Park
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Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, supra, 233 Minn. at
469, 47 N.W. 2d at 196.
The reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court is
sound. The defendant could have voluntarily paid anyone, even his creditors, all of the funds in the joint account, and thus an involuntary payment should not be
treated inconsistently with those voluntary rights. The
Minnesota Supreme Court further stated as follows:
"Intervener, haYing agreed to allow defendant to
treat the funds in their joint account as his individual property, is in no position to assert that
creditors, subrogated to his rights, may not treat
them as if they were his individual property. Intervener assumed the risk that defendant would
pay these creditors voluntarily, and we fail to see
why an involuntary payment stands upon a different footing. If Intervener assumed the risk
that her husband would voluntarily honor his
debts out of this account, we see no meritorious
reason why she should be legally entitled to eschew the risk that he will be compelled to do so.
The law should not hedge intervener's risk at the
exact instant when the degree of her risk rests
upon a point of honor. We shall not assume that
intervener took the risk that her husband would
honor his debts out of this account merely because she thought he could not be compelled to do
so." Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, supra, 233
Minn. at 469, 47 N.W. 2d at 196-97.
This Court should not encourage resp011dent to do
his boo~eeping in court when by his very contract
with First Security Bank of Utah,N.A. he has virtually
declared that he does not want to be inconvenienced by
any strict accountability as Letween himself and his wif t>,
defendant Ila R. Painter.
16

rrhe 1\finnesota Supreme Court pointed out the fatal
effect of allowing a party to the joint accow1t, such as
respondent in the case at bar, to come into court and
claim that the account is his and exempt from garnishment.
''Any presumption, whether conclusive or rebuttahle, that part or all of these joint accounts are
immune from garnishment has the effect of either
creating or tending to create a nonstatutory exemption for the parties using them, and any attempt to base the extent of garnishment upon
the respectirn amounts of the account owned by
each depositor will compel courts and juries to
grope with problems which the depositors themselves have declared to be of no consequence. Let
them abide the results which flow from their own
declared purposes. Park Enterprises, Inc. v.
Track, supra, 233 Minn. at 470, 47 N.W. 2d at 197.
This same reasoning was applied in Empire Fertilizers, Ltd. v. Cioci, 4 D.L.R. 804 (1934), where the Canadian court stated as follows:
"If the judgment debtor, B. N. Cioci, had given
to the judgment creditor a cheque signed by B. N.
Cioci alone on the Royal Bank, Jane and Annette
Branch, Toronto, for the amount owing by Cioci
on the judgment, the bank, on presentment of
such cheque for payment, would have had to pay
it, on the penalty of an action for damages by
B. N. Cioci, against the bank if such cheque had
been dishonoured. I see no reason why this judgment creditor of B. N. Cioci should not have recourse to these proceedings to compel such appropriation of these funds as was within the power of Cioci himself at the time of the issue and
servwe of the garnishee summons on the
bank .... ''
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Empire Fertilizers, Ltd. v. Cioci, supra, 4 D.L.R.
at 805.
Either defendant Ila R. Painter or respondent could
at any time withdraw all or any part of the funds in the
joint bank account and each had unconditional power to
utilize moneys in the account. See also section 7-3-45,
Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1967), which states as
follows:
"When a deposit has been made in any bank in
the names of two or more persons, payable to any
one of such persons or the survivor of them, such
deposit or any part thereof or any interest or
dividend thereon may be paid to any one of such
persons, whether the other or others be living or
not, and the receipt or acquittance of the person
so paid shall be a valid and sufficient release and
discharge to the bank for any payment so made.''
Inasmuch as either defendant Ila R. Painter or respondent could have withdrawn the entire amount of the
joint checking account, the only logical conclusion is that
appellant should be subrogated to the rights of defendant Ila R. Painter, and allowed a garnishee judgment for
the entire account.
The case of Neill v. Royce, s11pra, stands for the
premise that joint bank accounts may be reached by a
creditor. of one of the joint owners. In that case a divorced wife, in an attempt to obtain unpaid support
money from the defendant, obtained a reestraining order
against the defendant, restraining him from disposing
of his assets. A copy of the restraining order was served
upon a bank where the defendant and his second 'vife
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had a joint savings account. rrhe second wife intervened
in the action and testified that the funds in the bank
account were her separate property, left to her by her
deceased first husband and intended for the education
of her children by the first marriage.
This Court discussed the status of a creditor's claim
on a joint bank account as follows:
''In the instant case, however, we do not have a
suit between a codepositor and the representatives of the deceased codepositor. We have a suit
by a third party against the interest of one of the
living codepositors. This court having made the
written instrument conclusive evidence in the
case of the deceased codepositor, Holt v. Bayles,
supra, the question arises what presumption will
the law purport to a joint tenancy agreement
where both parties to the written agreement are
still alive.'' Neill v. Royce, supra, 101 Utah at
185, 120 P.2d at 329.
This Court further discussed the presumption:
''This court does not agree with counsel for the
respondent that Holt v. Bayles, supra, and the
conclusive principle therein laid down that 'intention ceases to be an issue and the courts are bound
by the agreement' as being controlling under the
circumstanees of the instant case; nevertheless,
there remains a presumption of joint tenenacy
where both cotenants are alive. * * * This presumption, in,jr,cted by courts of equity since ancient time, continues and ca1Jz be overcome by the
intrn"enfr only by clear and convincing proof to
t71 e contrary." (Emphasis added) Neill v. Royce,
supra, 101 Utah at 188, 120 P.2d at 330-331.
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In discussing the evidence introduced and clearly stating
that the evidence was not sufficient to overcome the presumption, this Court stated as follows :
"The only evidence refuting the implied joint savings account in the instant case was that of the
testimony of the codepositors to the effect that
their purpose in establishing the joint savings
account was to take advantage of the survivorship provision, and that the money was intended
to be the sole and separate property of the intervener. Such proof under the circumstances of this
case cannot be termed so clear and convincing as
to require the trial court to find in favor of the
appellant. To say that it was sufficient woulrl
throw open the door to fraud and collusion as between codepositors and third parties. This equity
will not do." (Emphasis added) Neill v. Royce,
supra, 101 Utah at 189, 120 P.2d at 331.
B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REACHING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
1. Findings of Fact Numbered 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8
Are Not Supported by the Evidence.

Finding of Fact No. 1 is not supported by the evidence. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that
appellant caused to be served upon First Security Bank
of Utah N.A. a Writ of Garnishment directed against
property of Carpets, Inc.
Finding of Fact No. 2 does not set forth the complete answers of the garnishee, First Security Bank of
Utah, N.A. to the interrogatories of the Garnishment
served upon it by appellant. That finding deletes that
portion of the answer which states as follows:
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''On February 7, 1964, he presented a check drawn
by him against said joint account for withdrawal
of the full amount remaining in said account and
demanded payment of said amount to him. In the
absence of proof or knowledge to the contrary we
assume that the statement and claim of Fred L.
Painter are correct.''
The fact that respondent presented a check to the
Nephi, Utah, branch of First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A., and withdrew the funds in the joint account, is
material as to the length of time respondent was without
use of the funds and should be made a part of said
finding.
Finding of Fact No. 6 should be amended to delete
that portion of the finding which states "that no answer
or counter-affidavit was filed by the plaintiff or by the
garnishee.'' Said portion of the finding is irrelevant and
immaterial to the issues at hand.
Finding of Fact No. 7 should be amended to delete
the portion of the finding which states "that the funds
deposited in said joint bank account were at the time of
deposit the sole property of said intervener and not the
property of his wife, Ila R. Painter; that said intervener
was at the time of service of said writ of garnishment on
said garuishee the true owner of said joint account. ... ''
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in part,
states as follows:
''In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
... the court shall, unless the same are waived,
find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of
the appropriate judgment .... "
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It is a well-accepted rule that written findings of
fact a11d conclusions of law must be separately stated.
However, the portion of Finding of Fact No. 7 quoted
above is not supported by any evidence and if it were
supported by the evidence would be a conclusion of law.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record to indicate
that Mr. Painter was the true owner of the joint bank
account either at the time said deposit was made or at
the time of service of the Garnishment.
Finding of Fact No. 7 should be further amended
to delete that portion of said finding which states "that
by reason of service of said writ of garnishment said
intervener has been continuously deprived of funds constituting said joint account." That portion of the finding is controverted by the Answer to Interrogatories on
Garnishment filed by the garnishee, wherein it was stated
respondent presented a check to garuiRhee on February
7, 1964, for withdrawal of the full amount remaining in
said joint bank account.
Finding of Fact No. 8 should be amended to delete
that portion of the finding which states that "such demands have been wrongfully refused .... '' Said finding is
a conclusion of law and is not supported by the evidence
in the record.

2. Conclusions of Law Are Not Supported
Evidence.

uy

the

The Conclusions of Law reacheJ by the lower court
state, in part, as follows:
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''From the foregoing facts the court concludes
that the intervener, Fred L. Painter, is now and
at all times herein mentioned \Vas the owner and
entitled to the use of the funds on deposit in said
joint bank account at the First Security Bank of
Utah, N.A. in the sum of $723.79 .... "
There is absolutely no competent evidence that respondent is or at any time was the sole owner of the
joint bank account. Even if respondent was at one time
the owner of said funds, this is immaterial because of
the rights vested in defendant Ila R. Painter under the
terms of the joint bank account.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court
erred in releasing and discharging the joint bank account and in awarding judgment to respondent and
against appellant for interest and attorney's fees and
the judgment should be reversed. Appellant further submits that it should be awarded a garnishee judgment on
the total of the joint bank account because to hold otherwise would act as a fraud upon creditors and in direct
contradiction to the terms of the joint bank account
agreement signed by defendant Ila R. Painter and
respondent.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& :McCARTHY
RoBERT :M. ANDERSON and
STEPHEN D. SWINDLE
Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
23

